Emerging Europe suffered larger output declines during 2008-09 than any other region in the world. However, some countries experienced much smaller declines than others; major balance-ofpayments crises and banking collapses were avoided; and economic policy reactions stayed well clear of populist and confiscatory measures experienced in previous crises. This paper argues that this can be attributed to European economic and political integration. It shows that foreign bank ownership was a mitigating factor in the output decline, and that more than half of the cross-country variation in output decline can be explained by a small group of macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
When measured by the size of output declines in late 2008 and the first half of 2009, the global financial crisis hit emerging Europe harder than any other region of the world. 2 Given the high degree of integration of the region with advanced countries at the centre of the crisis, and large pre-crisis financing needs and macroeconomic vulnerabilities, this is not surprising. Rather more surprising are two facts.
 The region has been surprisingly resilient in several ways. With few exceptionsnamely the Baltic states and Kazakhstan, where the crisis began in 2007 -the crisis arrived late, in the third and fourth quarters of 2008. Until then, most countries in the region enjoyed an extraordinary period of "decoupling", with output and credit growth continuing unabated, notwithstanding the fact that the financial crisis had already engulfed the advanced economies for over a year. Furthermore, the crisis is missing some of the defining attributes of emerging market crises in the past. No country has suffered an uncontrolled currency collapse coupled with a systemic banking crisis, although some have come perilously close.
 Although the region has been hard hit on average, there is an extraordinary degree of variation in the extent to which countries within the region have been affected. Yearon-year output growth in the first quarter of 2009 was in the negative double digit range in several countries, but still in the low positive single digits in others. This variation roughly corresponds to EBRD and IMF projections for the whole year, so it is unlikely to be just a reflection of differences in the timing of the crisis impact.
The purpose of this paper is to document these two facts and take a first step towards understanding them.
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The paper's main thesis is that the resilience of the region can be linked to a particular model of European integration: namely, financial integration through international banking groups, and political and institutional integration with western Europe. The former softened the blow of the capital flow reversal, while the latter helps to explain why the region, unlike emerging market regions in the past, did not descend into a spiral of destructive and populist policy reactions and twin crises.
As far as the cross-country variation in growth declines is concerned, a preliminary analysis suggests that this is most robustly related to pre-existing debt levels, and to a lesser extent to the structure of foreign liabilities. Since the accumulation of foreign debt is clearly a by-product of financial integration, this leads to the overall conclusion that financial integration has been a mixed blessing in this crisis. The question, which we leave for future research, is why some countries but not others managed to benefit from the stabilising aspects of integration while avoiding its risks.
While the results point towards a stabilising role of foreign bank ownership during the crisis, this paper does not evaluate the overall role of foreign banks in economic and financial development of emerging Europe. Doing so would require also examining the role of foreign banks before the crisis; both in facilitating financial deepening and accelerating economic growth, and in contributing to the build-up of macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities. EBRD (2009, Chapter 3) analyses these issues in some detail and finds evidence for a role of foreign banks, and of foreign financing more generally, in both of these areas.
In the next section we briefly summarise the background to the crisis and the main course of the crisis so far, document the region's initial resilience and show the large crosscountry variation in crisis impact. We then examine the possible causes of these two phenomena in turn. A concluding section summarises our views on the outlook and risks for the region in the immediate future.
BACKGROUND: A CAPITAL INFLOW AND CREDIT BOOM, 2001-07
From the beginning of this decade until the first half of 2008, the economies of central and eastern Europe (CEE) experienced large capital inflows from the West, a credit boom and rapid expansions in both consumption and investment. The counterpart to this boom was a sharp increase in private sector external indebtedness. In most countries, debt was denominated primarily in foreign currency, making corporate and household borrowersand hence creditor banks -vulnerable to a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Chart 1 documents these developments and compares them to those in other emerging market regions. Chart 1a shows that emerging Europe (excluding Russia, which initially suffered a crisis and later benefited from an oil boom, leading to capital account surpluses) received much higher capital inflows compared to both Latin America and emerging Asia. Private net capital inflows consistently exceeded 5 per cent of regional GDP and rose to over 10 per cent of GDP by 2007.
This rise coincided with a sharp increase in credit (Chart 1a). Beginning with relatively low levels -about 30 per cent of GDP on average, in line with Latin America, and much below emerging Asia -the ratio of credit to GDP doubled over the course of six years. Chart 1c documents the correlation between the size of bank debt inflows and credit booms during the 2005-07 boom period. Finally, Chart 1d shows that private external indebtedness was correlated, across countries, with a high share of foreign currency lending, with most (but not all) countries in the region exposed in both dimensions.
By the time the financial crisis erupted in advanced countries in the summer of 2007, emerging Europe had experienced many of the classic macro-financial vulnerabilities that formed the basis of past emerging market crises -in particular, the Asian crisis of 1997-98, in which currency mismatches and private indebtedness also played a critical role.
THE CRISIS: A SYNOPSIS
In July and August 2007 the crisis in the US subprime mortgage sector erupted and quickly spilled over to securitised assets more generally, both in the United States and in Europe. With confidence in the balance sheets of financial institutions holding such assets shaken, money markets dried up. Risk premiums rose sharply, affecting corporate borrowing. The US high-yield bond spread, traditionally a bell-wether for global risk aversion and a solid predictor of financing conditions in emerging markets, quickly doubled from around 250 to about 500 basis points by September. Given the large macro-financial vulnerabilities in most emerging European countries, a shock of this size at the centre of the international financial system might have been expected to trigger a "sudden stop" in capital flows, followed by a credit contraction, depreciations, insolvencies of borrowers indebted in foreign currency and output declines. Yet this did not occur. Instead, the crisis unfolded in three phases. activity contracted rapidly, with almost no lag. By November, many countries were experiencing large declines in industrial production and domestic credit growth began to weaken for the first time in years. By the second half of February the crisis was spilling from the real into the financial sector, as fears of bank credit losses triggered a new wave of currency pressures. In January and February 2009 industrial production data revealed sharp contractions in countries that had previously been resilient (for example, some southeastern European countries), albeit with large cross-country differences. The most likely future path for the region is one of gradual stabilisation and eventual recovery in 2010. This said, the situation in some countries -most acutely Ukraine and Latvia -remains precarious (for different reasons). In addition, non-performing loans in the banking system are still significantly below their expected peaks in most countries in the region. The question is whether financial systems will be able to withstand the expected stress without a new breakdown in confidence, which could lead to bank runs and a new round of output collapses. We return to the challenges that this poses for policy in the concluding section of this paper.
RESILIENCE: FACTS AND TENTATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Emerging Europe has been surprisingly resilient to the crisis in two respects. First, as documented above, the shocks at the centre were not felt in the region for over a year after the US and western European crises erupted. Second, and less obviously, the region exhibited resilience along some important dimensions even after the crisis hit. This claim rests on two facts: one qualitative and one quantitative.
First, notwithstanding the large output costs of the crisis and the expected high costs in terms of insolvencies, unemployment and bank recapitalisation, there are some thresholds that this crisis has not crossed.
 Most emerging market crises were "twin crises" that involved temporary loss of macroeconomic control: currency crises with large overshooting of exchange rates, runs on the banking system and the collapse of systemic banks.  Policy reactions in these crises often involved coercive measures that overturned the rules of financial relationships, and sometimes private contracts, at least temporarily: capital controls, standstills, bank holidays, deposit withdrawal restrictions and forced currency conversions.  Finally, emerging market crises have often been accompanied by political turmoil and reactions against incumbent regimes and ideologies. Argentina's 2001 crisis led to the resignation of two presidents in the space of a few weeks. The Asian crisis triggered the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia.
To be sure, there have been instances of collapses and nationalisations of large banks in emerging Europe (most prominently Parex in Latvia and BTA in Kazakhstan); currency controls in Ukraine and a few other countries; several changes of government; and political unrest in Moldova and Georgia. But bank nationalisations have also occurred in western Europe over the same period; currency controls seem to have been largely consistent with the normal conduct of business; and political changes occurred in the course of the normal political process and affected governments that were already weak before the crisis. Furthermore, these changes have not, so far, benefited populist, nationalist or anti-reform governments (see EBRD, 2009, Chapter 6) .
Second, while the financial shock to emerging Europe in the fourth quarter of 2008 and at the beginning of 2009 was large and damaging, it was nonetheless moderate compared to shocks suffered by other emerging market regions and advanced financial markets. Chart 5b shows that emerging Europe suffered smaller bank lending outflows, as a share of existing bank assets, than other developing and emerging market regions. The fact that the shocks to advanced country risk premiums in September of 2008 had a smaller than onefor-one effect on emerging market risk -with no noticeable difference between emerging Europe and the emerging market average -is apparent from Chart 3a. Chart 5a confirms that the response of emerging market risk premiums -including in emerging Europe -to financial shocks in advanced countries has indeed been muted in the present crisis compared to previous episodes. The idea is to compute correlations of emerging market risk spreads with a widely used indicator of risk in advanced countries, the implied volatility index of S&P 500 stocks, the "VIX", during periods of financial market volatility in the United States. These are identified as periods in which the VIX consistently averaged 25 (it normally fluctuates between 10 and 20). Because emerging markets are small compared to US financial markets, correlations between the VIX and emerging market risk can be assumed to reflect the effect of the former on the latter, rather than vice versa. The main insight is that this effect was much smaller than usual between July 2007 and August 2008, when the financial crisis was already under way in the United States (see EBRD, 2009, Box 1.2 for details). After the expansion of the crisis in September 2008 the correlation rose but it remained below its typical level in previous crises. Furthermore, the level of financial stress in advanced countries in this period, as measured by the VIX, was much higher than in any of the previous crisis periods.
What explains emerging Europe's financial resilience compared to earlier emerging market crises and other emerging markets during the present crisis? Since emerging Europe in many respects suffered greater pre-crisis macro-financial vulnerabilities than other regions (in particular, higher external debt, larger pre-crisis credit booms, and higher shares of foreign currency borrowing), the answer must be that these were partly or wholly offset by comparative strengths. One candidate might be relatively sound public balance sheets, but this feature was shared by other emerging market countries. However, the region also benefited from two additional structural characteristics that are unique to emerging Europe.
First, political and economic proximity to, and in some cases membership in, the European Union. As Chart 6 illustrates, virtually all emerging European countries have by now developed political and economic ties of various strengths with the European Union. These ties benefited them in two ways.  Through a political commitment mechanism, which may have had salutary implications on the handling of the crisis. Countries that maintain close political and economic ties to the European Union (and possibly harbour expectations to join the European Union in the future) are more likely to respect international commitments and less likely to undertake measures that interfere with private contracts or come at the expense of foreign banks and investors. Along with institutional development since the collapse of central planning, this may help explain why the domestic policy response has generally been mature and populism has been muted, in spite of the large output collapses and associated social costs that the region has suffered. The second characteristic is the role of international banking groups in emerging European financial sectors, which have a significantly higher degree of foreign ownership than other emerging market regions (see Chart 6b). A recent empirical literature concludes that international bank lending through a local network of branches and subsidiaries is much more stable than direct cross-border lending, and shows that foreign bank subsidiaries reduce their lending less during a financial crisis than domestic bank lending.
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This could help explain why bank lending outflows from emerging Europe were generally more moderate than from other regions.
In the remainder of this section we test the proposition that foreign bank ownership attenuated bank lending outflows at the height of the financial crisis. We examine two samples: a large sample comprising 64 emerging markets, developing countries and transition economies; and a smaller sample of 25 transition economies only (emerging Europe plus some central Asian countries). Chart 7 shows the correlation between crossborder bank lending and foreign ownership in both samples in the fourth quarter 2008, when the "sudden stop" of capital flows to emerging markets occurred. Data points corresponding to transition economies are labelled with their country codes. The figure shows two simple regression lines: one associated with the whole sample and the other with the transition sample only. The coefficient is positive in both cases, indicating that flows were indeed more resilient in countries with higher foreign bank ownership. The question is whether this correlation can be interpreted as causal. In general, the answer is clearly no, as the correlation might pick up the influence of other variables that are correlated with both foreign ownership and outflows. For example, foreign banks may decide to invest in countries that have better fundamentals, and it may be differences across these fundamentals, as opposed to the presence of international bank groups per se, that explain the smaller outflows in the crisis.
To disentangle the effects of economic fundamentals which may be correlated with high foreign ownership from those of foreign ownership per se, we regress net cross-border flows after the "Lehman shock" on the (pre-crisis) share of foreign bank ownership, the country sovereign credit rating as a summary measure of fundamentals, and purchasing power adjusted per capita GDP as a general measure of the level of development. Table 1 shows the results. The dependent variable is Q4 2008 cross-border lending flows (expressed as per cent of Q3 2008 bank asset stocks). Regressions were performed first on a broad sample of emerging market and transition countries (defined largely by availability of data on foreign bank ownership); 7 and then separately on the transition and nontransition subsamples. The results show a statistically significant effect of foreign bank ownership in the expected direction (that is, stabilising) in both the broad and the transition samples. The remaining coefficients also have the expected signs. The magnitude of the effect is larger than in the simple correlations of Chart 7: a 10 percentage point increase in the asset share of foreign banks appears to reduce the outflow by about 1.4 percentage points. When compared to an average outflow of about 6 per cent of Q3 2008 asset stocks in the fourth quarter (see Chart 5), this is quite a large effect. A one notch deterioration of the credit rating is associated with a larger average outflow of about the same magnitude (1.5-1.9 percentage points).
Although the coefficients for foreign bank ownership are very similar in the broad sample and the transition sample, it turns out that the effect in the broad sample is driven by the presence of the transition group. When this is dropped, the coefficient is much reduced in size and no longer statistically different from zero (regression 3). Regression 4, in which an interaction between foreign bank ownership and a "transition dummy" was added to the regression in the broad sample, confirms that foreign bank ownership seems to have had a significantly stronger effect in mitigating the outflow of cross-border debt in transition countries than in non-transition countries. A possible interpretation is that the foreign owners in the transition group are mostly European banking groups with stronger longterm commitments to emerging Europe than may be typical in other cross-border banking settings, perhaps due to the presence of a formal institutional structure (the European Union), and/or expectations of long-term European integration.
When a transition dummy is included in the regression in addition to the foreign bank ownership variable and the interaction term, then all three variables lose statistical significance (regression 5). This reflects the fact that that higher foreign bank ownership and membership in the transition group are highly correlated, but it also raises the question whether there are other structural factors that are picked up by the transition dummy which may be driving the results on foreign bank ownership in regressions 1 and 4. While the presence of such factors could not, of course, explain why the bank ownership effect prevails even within the transition group (regression 2), it is nonetheless important to check the robustness of this effect to the inclusion of other variables that could be related both to the decision of international banking groups to acquire banks in a country, and outflows in the crisis. Because the transition-only sample is so small (only 25 observations), the only way of doing this is to sequentially include potentially omitted variables individually in the baseline regression, to see how this affects the coefficients of the remaining variables (particularly our main variable of interest, foreign bank ownership). Table 2 ), the 98 estimated coefficients are all in the interval between 0.04 and 0.20, compared with a baseline coefficient of 0.14. 
EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN GDP DECLINES EMERGING EUROPE
We now turn to the second salient fact of the 2008-09 crisis in emerging Europe: the large cross-country variation in crisis-related output declines. Chart 8 documents this variation using three different measures. . This is the best measure in so far as it captures the effect of the shocks suffered by the European transition region in terms of output in the two main crisis quarters. The main disadvantage is that official seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter data are not available for most countries in the sample, so it is necessary to apply an alternative seasonal adjustment in these cases. In Chart 8, countries are ranked in a decreasing sequence of output growth according to the first measure. It is clear that there is a large variation across countries no matter which measure is used. The correlation coefficient between the first and each of the other two measures is 0.84; and between the second and third 0.88. For the statistical analysis that follows we focus on the second measure (cumulative output decline in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009). Using the other two measures would lead to broadly similar conclusions.
We now explore the statistical relationship between cumulative output declines in the crisis and pre-crisis fundamentals. Doing so requires confronting similar problems as mentioned in the previous section:
 many potential fundamentals could matter. In the context of a cross-sectional regression with around 25 observations, it is impossible to analyse them all at the same time  countries suffered shocks of different magnitudes. In addition to controlling for the effect of export shocks, one would ideally also want to control for financial shocks. However, the latter cannot be measured directly (as bank debt inflows, for example, could be responding to differences in output declines rather than the other way around).
To address these problems (although imperfectly), potential determinants of the output decline are divided into two groups. The first group contains export growth, external debt at the end of 2007 as a basic measure for macroeconomic vulnerability, and corruption perceptions (taken from the 2008 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank) as a basic measure of institutional quality.
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The second group comprises a set of additional pre-crisis fundamentals: the credit-to-GDP ratio as a measure of financial development; changes in this ratio during 2005-08 as a measure of the pre-crisis credit boom; the loan-to-deposit ratio as a measure of foreign financing; openness to trade; reserves as a share of short-term debt; the asset share of foreign banks in the banking system; the stock of foreign direct investment liabilities; the current account deficit in 2007; the share of foreign currency debt in total liabilities of the banking system; and a dummy variable for the different exchange rate regimes.
The potential relevance of these measures is investigated in two steps. First, sequentially, by adding them to the first group containing the three basic controls (Table 3) . Second, the robustness of the results is checked by running regressions that include two to three of these variables at the same time, and by controlling for debt inflows and trade finance (Table 4) .
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results of a regression containing only the three core control variables (export growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, private external debt and the corruption variable). Only one of them -pre-crisis external debt-to-GDP ratio -exhibits a statistically significant association with the decline in output. In columns 2 to 10, nine additional controls are added individually to the regression. In most cases, the statistically significant relationship between the output decline and pre-crisis debt survives these additions. Among the additional variables, only four -credit growth during 2005-08; a dummy representing hard pegs, FDI as a share of GDP; and foreign bank ownership (measured as in the previous section) -turn out to be statistically significantly associated with the output decline.
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Note that FDI and foreign bank ownership enter with positive signs, suggesting that they had a stabilising effect. Table 4 shows what happens to these results when several of these variables are inclu ultaneously in the regression and extra controls are added. Columns 1 and 2 suggest estic credit booms (negatively) and foreign bank ownership (positively) are the ost robust pre-crisis predictors of the output decline. This is true even when the tage change in trade credits (column 3) and the percentage change in cross-border gressions (columns 3 and 4). inally, in Table 4 , perceived corruption also appears to be economically and statistic tly associated with output declines. A one-grade increase in perceived corrup mple from "minor obstacle" to "moderate obstacle" or from "moderate obstacle" is associated with a larger cumulative output decline of ercentage points. 
WORLD-WIDE SAMPLE
As in the analysis of the determinants of cross-border outflows performed earlier, it is interesting to study the determinants of output declines in a broader cross-country sample that includes countries outside emerging Europe, both to provide some reassurance in light of the small set of observations used in the previous section and to check whether the findings for the emerging Europe region differ from those for the rest of the world.
In addition, a broader sample enables one to look at the effects of additional pre-crisis fundamentals on which the transition country sample did not provide sufficient information. In particular, we are interested in two questions. First, what was the role of commodity exports in crisis-related GDP declines -were commodity-rich countries hit harder, given a decline in oil and other commodity prices of approximately 70 per cent between July 2008 and January 2009? Second, what role did financial development play? The previous section suggested that rapid financial deepening -as proxied by the rise in the credit-to-GDP ratio in the three to four years before the crisis -exacerbated the bust. But the effects of the level of financial development may well be different, as deeper financial systems should make it easier for economic agents to insure against external shocks. Using a broader sample, it may be possible to distinguish between the effects of the level of financial development and recent changes in it.
However, moving to a global sample also brings some complications. First, there are differences in the quarterly timing of the crisis across countries. Second, comparing realised growth in the quarters with the highest output contractions may not be very meaningful across countries with vastly different potential growth rates (for example, China on the one hand and mature western European economies on the other). We address these issues by measuring growth declines in terms of the deviation of expected real economic growth in 2009 from the annualised average over the period 1999-2008. 13 The forecasts are taken from the October 2009 IMF World Economic Outlook.
Table 5 first confirms that, controlling for the average growth during the preceding period and per capita income (adjusted for PPP differentials), countries in the transition region on average experienced a more severe output decline, by about 5 percentage points, than the average non-transition country (column 1). Furthermore, richer countries and countries that experienced faster growth during the boom years were generally hit harder.
Columns 2 and 3 examine the effects of commodity resources, proxied either by the value of produced oil (at international prices) as a share of GDP or, more broadly but at the cost of losing observations, by the share of commodities in merchandise exports. In addition, these regression models include pre-crisis credit growth, measured as in Tables 2 and 3 ; the pre-crisis loan-to-deposit ratio as a measure of banking sector reliance on external financing, and the credit-to-GDP ratio in 2007 (as reported in the World Bank New Dataset on Financial Development) as a measure of financial development. The results suggest that the commodity revenues, regardless of how they are measured, appear to have had a stabilising effect on output. Note: Financial integration is measured by the ratio of assets and liabilities to GDP. Sources: see Tables 1 and 2 .
As in the transition-only sample, a rapid increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio during the boom years before the crisis is associated with a larger output decline, as is a higher loanto-deposit ratio. At the same time, the level of financial development (higher credit-to-GDP ratio) has the opposite, positive, effect on growth performance during the crisis. Note that financial development appears to have a significant stabilising effect, notwithstanding the inclusion of two factors commonly associated with financial deepening: per capita income and institutional quality (proxied by the rule of law index taken from the World Bank Governance Indicators). Hence, it is unlikely that the significance of level of financial development merely reflects other characteristics of economic and institutional development.
14 Next, we examine the effect of financial integration and external liabilities. When financial integration is added to model 3, its effect is small and statistically insignificant. At the same time, model 4 shows a pronounced negative effect within the transition region: the interaction term between the transition dummy and financial developments has a statistically significant coefficient, reflecting mainly the association between external debt and output growth (column 5). In this crisis, this association was negative both in the transition and non-transition samples, but statistically significant only in the former.
In a smaller sample of emerging markets it is also possible to look at the impact of foreign bank ownership on growth declines. The coefficient on the share of foreign banks in total banking assets is positive but not statistically significant (column 6). Column 7 suggests that the mitigating effect of foreign bank ownership "works" by offsetting the destabilising effect of high external debt. The interaction term between financial integration and the dummy variable for significant presence of foreign banks (defined as a market share by assets above 32 per cent − the median value in the sample) is positive and statistically significant. At the median value of financial integration (164 per cent of GDP), the interaction term suggests a softening impact of foreign bank ownership on output decline of between 0.7 and 2.8 percentage points.
Finally, column 8 shows that when the main macroeconomic fundamentals explored in column 7 are taken into account, the transition region dummy variable is no longer statistically significant, suggesting that the vulnerabilities included in the column 7 model go a long way in accounting for the strikingly larger output declines in the transition region compared to other regions.
CONCLUSION
Despite large output declines, the crisis in the transition region involved a comparatively mild reversal in capital flows and has so far stopped short of systemic currency and banking crises. In light of large pre-crisis vulnerabilities in many countries in the region, this is surprising.
This paper interprets this fact as reflecting offsetting strengths that are specific to emerging Europe, including a high degree of integration with western Europe. Controlling for a large set of fundamentals, we show that countries with the higher shares of foreign-owned banks in the financial system tended to suffer smaller bank lending outflows in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009. Higher foreign bank ownership is also associated with milder output declines in the transition region. In contrast, the size of pre-credit credit booms, higher external debt and hard pegs are predictors of larger declines.
Since foreign banks contributed to credit booms and external debt accumulation in emerging Europe, the overall effect of financial integration on the crisis in emerging Europe appears to have been mixed. While foreign banks had a stabilising effect in the crisis, this mainly took the form of neutralising imbalances that they themselves had helped create in earlier years.
Looking forward, the continued ability of emerging Europe to contain the crisis -and in particular to ride out the inevitable rise in unemployment and non-performing loans over the next few quarters -will largely depend on two factors.
The first is dealing with the increasingly daunting fiscal fallout of the crisis. In line with much higher than expected output declines, the crisis is tearing much larger than expected holes in government budgets. These will require a combination of additional external and fiscal adjustment, particularly through structural fiscal measures, which will bring benefits not only during the crisis but also in the medium term.
The second is preparing for, and mitigating, the coming wave of corporate defaults and non-performing loans. If not addressed, these could threaten financial stability and trigger a new round of output declines. An effective response is likely to require additional action on two fronts: encouraging efficient corporate and household debt restructuring (or in some cases, liquidation); and ensuring adequate capitalisation of banking systems even after nonperforming loans rise sharply. This, in turn, may require recapitalisation by international banking groups and, if necessary, by home country authorities at the bank group level. All this has to happen in a way consistent with evolving European Union rules for state aid to the banking sector. It is also the European competition authority that, by default, has been charged with restructuring the large banking groups using these rules. The biggest challenges for European cooperation may still be ahead of us.
